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PROCESS-PRESENCE

Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1934) 54 S. Ct. 330.
The provision of Massachusetts
[Federal] Defendant Snyder and
two others were indicted for the practice giving the judge the right
murder of a filling station operator to deny the defendant the privilege
during a robbery. At the trial the of accompanying the jury on its
Commonwealth moved for a view view is peculiar to that state, but
of the scene of the offense, which its singularity furnishes no foundamotion was granted. The court ap- tion for its destruction unless it viopointed counsel for the defendants lates the Constitution. State courts
and legislatures are accorded great
to represent them at the view. Coun- latitude in providing alterations and
sel for Snyder moved that his client innovations in their procedure. Inbe permitted to view the premises deed, their policies, however unique,
with the jury. The motion was de- will not be disturbed unless they run
nied, in accordance with the Massa- afoul of some fundamental principle
chusetts practice, which gave the of justice deep-rooted in the Conjudge discretion in allowing the de- stitution: Hurtado v. California
fendant to accompany the jury when
(1883) 110 U. S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111;
making the view.
Snyder was N. Y. Central R. Co. v. White
found guilty. The judgment was
(1916) 243 U. S. 188, 27 S. Ct.
affirmed in the Supreme Court of 247.
Massachusetts, and the defendant
The Fourteenth Amendment conbrought certiorari to the United tains no literal guarantee of presState Supreme Court, basing his ap- ence throughout all stages of a trial.
plication upon the claim that his Its due process guarantee embraces
rights under the Fourteenth Amend- all the elements of a fair hearing,
ment had been violated by the leaving to be decided whether any
denial of his motion to view the individual deprivation of supposed
premises with the jury, since the right falls within that rubric. Nor
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed is there any uniform line of dethe defendant the right to be pres- cisions in the state or federal courts
ent throughout every stage of his which may be resorted to for the
trial. Held: affirmed. The Four- determination of the indispensable
teenth Amendment does not assure elements of due process in criminal
one charged with a felony the priv- cases. In general language, by way
ilege to be present at a mere view of dictum, it was stated in Hopt v.
of the scene of offense by the jury:
Utah (1883) 110 U. S. 574, 4 S.
OF DEFENDANT AT A JURY VIEW.-

[1102]

CRIMINAL CASES
Ct. 202, that the right of the accused to be present throughout the
trial was of the essence of due process. But trial in this sense does
not embrace the preliminary steps
antecedent to the hearing on the
merits, or the stages of the litigation after the rendition of the verdict: Schwab v. Berggren (1891)
143 U. S. 442, 12 S. Ct. 525; Dowdell v. United States (1910) 221 U.
S. 325, 31 S. Ct. 590. Numerous
cases throughout the states have
held that the privilege of continued
presence appears to be founded not
only upon the safeguard of confrontation of adverse witnesses, but
is intended also to secure to the defendant the right of hearing, seeing, and knowing all that passes
before the jury and has a bearing
upon his fate. Indeed, many cases
have held specifically that the defendant has the right to accompany
the jury upon its view: see note,
32 A. L. R. 1345. But these decisions are not without their limitations and counterparts. The defendant may lose his right by his
own conduct or by waiver: Diaz
v. United States (1911) 223 U. S.
442, 32 S. Ct. 250, or by a failure
to show that his absence at some
point in the trial worked substantial
injury to his cause: Whittaker v.
State (1927) 173 Ark. 1172, 294 S.
W. 397; Lowman v. State (1920)
80 Fla. 18, 85 So. 166; Commonwealth v. Kelly (1928) 292 Pa. 418,
141 Atl. 246.
The majority in the instant case
relied heavily upon the last element
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It reasoned that the privilege of presence must bear some
substantial relation to the opportunity to defend, and if presence would
be useless, or if no material benefits would be derived therefrom,
the protection of the Fourteenth

Amendment could not be invoked.
Cf. Howard v. Kentucky (1905) 200
U. S. 164, 26 S. Ct. 189. Valdez
v. United States (1916) 244 U. S.
432, 37 S. Ct. 725, amplified the
doctrine still further. It was there
held that the deprivation of rights
ordinarily extended to a defendant
must result in substantial detriment
to his cause in order to support
reliance upon the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Applying
this flexible doctrine to the Instdnt
case, it is evident, that the mere
view of the premises by the jury,
with the physical factors pointed
out mechanically without comment,
evidence, or argument, could not

affect the defendant's

case substan-

tially: People v. Bonney (1862) 19
Cal. 426. Nothing could be seen
on the view that could not be explained or amplified on trial, in the
presence of the defendant.
He
could do no more at the view than
his counsel, and the risk of injustice is slight. It follows from this
train of reasoning, considered with
the absence of a literal guarantee
of continued presence in the Fourteenth Amendment, that the facts
of the instant case did not justify
the extension of the protection of
due process. The majority would
throw such cases into the crepuscular zone of due process, where each
case stands upon its own facts.
The dissent based its argument
upon the dictum of the Hopt case
buttressed by similar dictum from
Lewis v. United States (1892) 146
U. S. 370, 13 S. Ct. 136. The dissentients felt that the view was a
material part of the trial, since it
was as material as testimony on the
stand in striking the balance between the defendant and the state.
If the defendant could not be barred
from the trial during the examination of witnesses, he should not be
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barred during the introduction of
equally weighty evidence in the
form of a jury view of the scene
of the offense, and such bar to his
presence constituted a deprival of
due process. Granting that the defendant sustained no substantial injury by his absence at the view,
still the element of presence was
essential to compliance with due
process, and the question of prejudice should not be allowed to confuse decision on the question
whether a right guaranteed by the
Constitution was denied.
The
former is determinable by a relative standard, while the latter
should be measured by an absolute.
The case presents a highly satisfactory means of resolving the
long-standing conflict between two
theories of criminal jurisprudence:
that which requires strict adherence
to procedural technicalities, and
that which seeks non-technical substantial justice, and allows flexibility and discretion in procedure.
The informal rule of due process
utilized by the court. which seeks
to ascertain only if injury was done
to the defendant's cause by the
technical omission, is admirably
adapted to the long-sought end of
a fair trial unfettered by the manacles of archaic procedure.
ROBERT L.

HABEAS
DUCTION

GROVER.

CORPUS-FORCEABLE
FROM

ASYLUM

AB-

STATE

INDICTING STATE.-[Federal]

TO

Peti-

tioner was under indictment in Indiana for bank robbery. The sheriff of Marshall County, Indiana,
accompanied by an Indiana officer
and two Chicago police officers, arrested petitioner at his Chicago residence and took him to Indiana
where next day a warrant was read
to him. Petitioner's application for

habeas corpus in Marshall County
having been refused, he sought a
writ in the United States District
Court. Held: a person charged with
a crime in one state and apprehended and abducted from another state
is not entitled to discharge on
habeas corpus in the federal courts.
His remedy is in the state courts:
Leahy v. Kunkel, Warden (D. C.
Ind. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 894.
It is admitted that it is highly
desirable to make the arrest and
conviction of criminals easy. In
this light, extradition dependent upon demand by one governor on another and governed by laws adopted
when travel was slow and escape
difficult, seems somewhat archaic.
Nevertheless in order that some
semblance of order may be kept,
it is necessary that the constitutional provisions and the statutory
law governing arrest and extradition be observed. The Federal Constitution accords the right of extradition in an orderly manner by Art.
IV, sec. 2, the right to security
against unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment,
and the right to equal protection of
laws by Amendment XIV.
Yet despite these constitutional
provisions which would seem- to indicate, at least, that an individual
is protected against the "legal kidnapping" resorted to in the instant
case, the courts have almost uniformly held to the contrary. A
person held in actual custody by a
state for trial in one of its courts
under an indictment for a crime
against its laws will not be released
on habeas corpus by a federal court
merely because the methods by
which his personal presence in a
state was secured may have violated the provisions of Art. IV, sec.
2: Pettibone v. Nichols (1906) 203
U. S. 192, 27 S. Ct. 111. Nor is
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there anything in the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States
which exempts an offender brought
before the courts of a state for an
offense against its laws from trial
and
punishment,
even
though
brought from another state by unlawful violence or by abuse of legal
process: LasceUes v. Georgia (1893)
148 U. S. 543, 13 S. Ct. 687; Ex
parte Johnson (1897) 167 U. S. 120,
17 S. Ct. 735. One abducted from
the asylum state to the indicting
state and there served with process
was not entitled to habeas corpus:
Mahon v. Justice (1887) 127 U. S.
700, 8 S. Ct. 1204. Courts of criminal jurisdiction need not inquire
how the prisoner came within reach
of its mandates: Chapman v. Scott
(D. C. Conn. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 156.
The same result is reached where,
instead of being illegally abducted
from one state to another the accused is kidnapped in a foreign
country and removed to this one,
Ex parte Campbell (D. C. Tex.
1932) 1 F. Supp. 899, or carried
from one federal district to another: United States ex rel. Voight
v. Toombs (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 67 F.
(2d) 744. But see Ex parte Broun
(D. C. N. Y. 1886) 28 Fed. 635,
where the district court, recognizing
unlawful arrest as a possible ground
for issuing habeas corpus, suggested
that a writ would issue if the stratagem used to get a fugitive within
the jurisdiction where he could be
lawfully arrested was itself an infraction of the law.
Where habeas corpus is refused
by the federal courts the petitioner
has two remedies: he can seek a
writ in the state courts, or he can
sue the arresting officers for false
imprisonment. But the remedies are
more illusory than real.
As to
habeas corpus in the state court,
it was refused in the instant case

before petitioner sought it in the
federal court. While there is a presumption that the state courts will
enforce the accused's rights under
the Federal Constitution and laws,
as stated in the instant case, nevertheless state courts are not inclined
to issue habeas corpus in this type
of case. As to the recovery for a
civil suit for false imprisonment,
it would be small comfort for him
once he is convicted.
There is no way of knowing how
many times this means of getting
fugitives into the jurisdiction in
which they are under indictment
has been used. In many cases the
criminal, realizing that he will be
tried eventually on the charge, may
agree to waive extradition in return for possible leniency from the
state's attorney. The court in the
instant case recognized the wrong
by the officers, stating that they
were without the pale of judicial
approval and should not be condoned or encouraged, but that it
is not within its power to do anything. Whether the desire for ease
of removal of fugitives should
override conformity with the lawful
means of extradition is a problem
of timely interest due to the present intensive drive on crime. Police officers should be allowed considerable leeway in the capture of
criminals, but abduction may well
be considered too extreme.
DENISON GROVES.
ExTRADITION - CRIMINALITY IN
STATE OF AsYLU.-[Federal]
On
complaint of British Consul, United
States Commissioner for the Northern District of Illinois issued a
warrant to hold petitioner, John
Factor, in custody for extradition
to England, on a charge of receiving certain sums of money, know-

iWO
ing the same to have been fraudulcntly obtained. On a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, the district
court ordered petitioner released on
the ground that the act charged was
not an offense under the law of Illinois, the place of asylum. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment. Held: on certiorari,
affirmed.
Under the applicable
treaties, extradition may be had, although the offense charged is not
criminal by the laws of the asylum
state:
Factor v. Laubenheimer
(1933) 54 S. Ct. 191.
The question was whether the offense charged is extraditable even
if the offense does not constitute
a crime under the laws of Illinois,
the asylum state, or by act of Congress. It is a generally recognized
principle of international law that,
in the absence of treaty, the offense for which extradition is
sought must be criminal in the jurisdiction where the accused is
found: Wright v. Henkel (1903)
190 U. S. 40, 23 S. Ct. 781. Application for extradition in this case
was brought under Article X of the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842:
1 Malloy, "Treaties" (1910) 650655, supplemented by the BlainePauncefote Convention of 1889:
ibid. 740. A question then arose as
to the interpretation of these treaties in the light of this general principle; whether it is incorporated
into the treaty sub silentio by necessary implication so as to be read
into its terms if not inconsistent
therewith, or whether it must be
specifically embodied in the treaty
to preserve it. The majority opinion in this case adopts the latter
interpretation, as being more conducive to the purposes of the treaty.
Article X of the 1842 treaty provides in substance that each country
shall deliver up to justice all per-
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sons who, being charged with any
of seven named crimes, committed
within the jurisdiction of either,
shall seek asylum or be found within the territory of the other, "provided that this shall only be done
on such evidence of criminality as,
according to the laws of the place
where the fugitive or person so
charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had there been committed
.
. ." The supplemental convention of 1889 provides that an additional list of crimes should be embraced in Article X of the treaty
of 1842. It lists ten numbered
classes of offenses, of which two
classes, §§4 and 10, specifically provide that the act charged must be
punishable by the laws of both
countries. The crime here charged
was brought under one of the other
classes, §3, where no such specific
limitation is mentioned.
The majority were of the opinion
that a liberal construction of the
treaty, as is the accepted policy in
the construction of international
agreements (Jordan v. Tashiro
(1928) 278 U. S. 123, 49 S. Ct. 47;
Asakura v. Seattle (1924) 265 U.
S. 332, 44 S. Ct. 515) required that
it be interpreted so as not to require criminality in the asylum
state. Thus it asserted that, inasmuch as criminality is expressly required in some of the classes, there
is no such requirement intended in
the others. And further that the
provision in Article X of the 1842
treaty, which provides that "this
shall only be done on such evidence
of criminality as according to the
laws of the place where the fugitive
shall be found would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial
if the offense had there been committed," should not be interpreted
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to require criminality in the asylum
state but merely refers to the procedure to be followed and to the
quantum of the proof required.
And moreover, the proviso in its
whole scope deals with procedure
and a different interpretation is inconsistent with the specific enumeration of classes where criminality
is required, since if the proviso
meant that criminality was required
then the express enumeration would
be unnecessary. This argument is
weakened by a circumspection of
the classes where this criminality
is explicitly required. In all instances the offenses are such that the
specific requirement is necessary so
as to limit them to criminal charges
to the exclusion of. merely civil
ones, such as fraud and offenses
against the bankruptcy laws. With
this explanation, the proviso relating to the quantum of the evidence
might better be said to "significantly
coincide" with thd principle that
criminality is required in the asylum
state, and that it supports that principle: dissenting opinion at p. 203.
It was stated that to ascertain the
meaning of a treaty the court may
look beyond its express words to the
negotiations and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting
parties, and that while the construction placed on a treaty by the political department of government is
not conclusive, it is nevertheless of
weight: Nielsen v. Johnson (1929)
279 U. S. 47, 49 S. Ct. 223; Charlton v. Kelly (1913) 229 U. S. 447,
33 S. Ct. 945. A perusal of the
diplomatic correspondence hardly
fortifies the conclusion reached by
the court. The only correspondence
relied on by the court was a letter
of instructions from Secretary of
State Calhoun to Edward Everett,
Minister to Great Britain, which
was an ex parte argument on behalf
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of slavery and not germane to the
issues then involved: Instructions,
Calhoun to Everett, Aug. 7, 1844,
No. 99; Instructions, Calhoun to
Everett, Jan. 28, 1845, No. 120. (All
the diplomatic correspondence referred to in this note is collected
in the "Appendix to Brief of Petitioner on Reargument.") But even
if the correspondence be considered
as an official ruling, the construction thus placed on the treaty was
never accepted by the British Government, Dispatch No. 55, Upshur
to Everett, Aug. 8, 1843; Note from
Thornton to Fish, Dec. 15, 1870,
and is directly contrary to the construction placed thereon by this
government both preceding and following the correspondence relied on
by the court: Dispatch No. 55,
supra; Note from Thornton to Fish,
Apr. 3, 1872.
The only case cited by the majority to substantiate the proposition that criminality in the asylum
state is not required, is the district
court case of It re Metzger (1847)
17 Fed. Cas. 232, Case No. 9511, in
which under a treaty with France,
it was decided that criminality in
the asylum state of New York was
not required. The fact was also
pointed out that extradition has
never been denied by the Supreme
Court because the offense was not
criminal in the place of asylum and
that the precise question has never
been before the court, Kelly v.
Griffin (1915) 241 U. S. 6, 36 S.
Ct. 487, and Benson v. McMahon
(1888) 127 U. S. 457, 8 S. Ct.
1240, being cited. But in each case
before the court the crime charged
has been judged to be criminal in
the asylum state, the court having
assumed in each instance that such
criminality was prerequisite, and
sometimes having taken great pains
to find the necessary local crimin-
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ality. It should be noted that the
entire weight of judicial authority,
save for the one case cited by the
court, has been to the effect that the
crime must be one against the laws
of both countries: Wright v.
Henkle, supra; Collins v. Loisel
(1922) 259 U. S. 309, 42 S. Ct. 469.
In the words of the court in the
instant case: "It is of some significance also that the construction
which petitioner urges would restrict the reciprocal operation of
the treaty. Under that construction
the right to extradition may vary
with the state or territory where the
fugitive is found, although extradition may be had from Great Britain
with respect to all offenses named
in the treaty." It is not clear how
the reciprocal operation of the
treaty can be furthered by the construction adopted by the court. To
the contrary, the effect of the decision is to prevent reciprocity and
equality of operation by requiring
the United States to deliver up
fugitives for acts not criminal in
the place of asylum, although Britain is not similarly bound: In re
John Anderson (1861)
11 Upper
Canada Common Pleas Report 2;
It re Windsor (1865) 6 Best &
Smith Rep. (Eng.) 522.
Perhaps the most cogent reason
for the majority construction of the
treaty was one of policy to further
the mutual friendly relationships ot
the two countries by granting extradition when possible. Where the
act is generally recognized as criminal, and is so acknowledged as
criminal as to be included in the
treaty, extradition should not fail
merely because the fugitive may
succeed in finding, in the country
of refuge, some state, territory, or
district, in which the offense
charged is not punishable. But on
the other hand there are compelling
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reasons why criminality in the state
of refuge should be required. To
be extraditable, the acts should be
crimes which it is to the common
interest of all to suppress; these are
such as are known and dealt with
by the law of all civilized nations.
It is not the purpose of extradition
to repress crimes created by the
laws of a particular people. That
the offense is in the treaty alone is
not sufficient. A prima facie case
must be made out before the commissioner who cannot be expected
to know or interpret the foreign
law, but must decide, according to
Article X of the treaty, whether
there is "such evidence of criminality, as according to the laws of the
place where the person so charged
shall be found, would justify his
apprehension and commitment for
trial if the offense had there been
committed." If local criminality is
not required, what should be the
basis of the test as to whether there
is sufficient evidence of criminality?
It would seem that local criminality
is a necessary implication in the
proviso: Report of the Royal Commissioners on Extradition, 1878.
It is true that the construction of
an extradition treaty is for the
courts, and they are not bound by
the construction placed thereon by
the executive or diplomatic branches
of government, or by that placed
thereon by the foreign country with
whom the treaty is made: Ex parte
Charlton (C. C. N. J. 1911) 185
Fed. 880, aff'd Charlton v. Kelly,
supra. But the desirability of so
interpreting a treaty contrary to the
accepted view of the courts, contrary to the view taken by the other
high contracting party, and contrary to the intent and interpretation made manifest by the preponderance of the diplomatic correspondence, is questionable. The

CRIMINAL CASES

1109

granting of extradition in this particular case was unimportant. It is
a situation which has never before
faced the court and may never face
it again. The important consideration is the potential consequences
which may result. The decision,
equally applicable to the DawesSimon Treaty of 1932, which is to
supersede all the prior extradition
treaties between the two governments, tends to burden the new
treaty with inconsistency, in that
under its terms (Art. 5) the statute of limitations will only run in
the asylum state if the offense is
there criminal, so that if not there
criminal, the fugitive can receive no
protection under it, thus favoring
the fugitive in the state where the
act is criminal. And possible consequences are not limited to Britain,
since the same construction would
apply to like treaties with other
nations, and in the same manner
hinder their operation.
ALEXANDER S.

MALTMAN.

ENTRAPMENT-NARcOTIC SALE IN
VIOLATION

OF HARRISON NARCOTIC

Acr.-[Federal]
A federal narcotic agent and a woman employed
as an informer, paid by the government, sought out the defendant to
purchase narcotics.
The woman
was an addict and a former mistress of the defendant. The defendant testified that after several
unsuccessful attempts had been
made to meet him, the woman accidentally met him on the street and
complained of pains and cramps in
the stomach for want of narcotics.
Thereupon, because of his sympathy
for her, the defendant declares that
he went to her room and gave her
an address with a note to some other
persons from whom she could obtain morphine. On the other hand,

the testimony of the government
agent and the woman informer indicated that the defendant was motivated in the sale of the morphine
by a desire for pecuniary profit.
The defendant was convicted on a
charge of conspiring to sell and distribute morphine in violation of the
Harrison Narcotic and Tariff Act,
26 U. S. C. A. §§211, 691-707. Defendant then assigned as error that
the trial judge withdrew from the
jury the defense of entrapment on
his plea of not guilty. Held: on
appeal, reversed. Where the evidence is conflicting the question of
entrapment under a plea of not
guilty should be given to the jury:
Wall v. United States (C. C. A.
5th, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 993.
The defense of entrapment existed at common law and was generally used where property was
taken by the accused with the
owner's consent or by reason of his
inducement, with the result that it
was not taken "against the owner's
will":
Bishop, "Criminal Law"
(9th ed. 1923) §926. This special
defense was later extended to cover
all situations wherein the defendant
was "encouraged" to commit a
crime at the suggestion of government officials or their agents. The
theory upon which the defense rests
is that "sound policy estops the government from asserting that an act,
which involves no criminal intent,
was voluntarily done, when it originated in and was caused by the
government
agent's
deception":
Voves v. United States (C. C. A.
7th, 1918) 249 Fed. 191; Bishop, op.
cit. supra, §926. Also see Butts v.
United States (C. C. A. 8th, 1921)
273 Fed. 35, 18 A. L. R. 143 at p.
146; Robinson v. United States (C.
C., A. 8th, 1928) 32 F. (2d) 505.
Thus the gist of entrapment is that
the law enforcing officer, by trick-
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ery, incites the accused to commit
an offense which he might not
otherwise have committed: Swallum v. United States (C. C. A. 8th,
1930) 39 F. (2d) 390. However,
if the intent and purpose on the
part of the accused to violate the
law were present, the mere fact that
government officers furnished the
opportunity for commission of the
offense is no defense: Reyff v. United
States (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) 2 F.
(2d) 39; Ritter v. United States
(C. C. A. 9th, 1923) 283 Fed. 187.
Doubtless due to the creation of
many new crimes by statutes and
the resultant establishment of special agencies for their enforcement,
the doctrine of entrapment has been
used as a defense with increasing
frequency.
That it is regarded
rather favorably by the courts is
apparent, for it has been stated that
the violation of the principles of
justice by the entrapment of the
unwary into crime should be dealt
with no matter by whom or at what
stage of the proceedings the facts
are brought to the attention of the
courts: Ganbino v. United States
(1927) 275 U. S. 310, 317, 48 S.
Ct. 137. Thus the court may discharge the accused upon a writ of
habeas corpus: United States ex
rel. HasseU v. Matthews (D. C. Pa.
1927) 22 F. (2d) 979; or quash an
indictment, or entertain a plea in
bar: United States v. Pappogoda
(D. C. Conn. 1923) 288 Fed. 214;
Spring Drug Co. v. United States
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926) 12 F. (2d)
852. Proof of entrapment at any
stage of the proceedings requires
the court to stop the prosecution,
direct the indictment to be quashed,
and the accused to be set at liberty.
Until the recent case of Sorrells
v. United States (1932) 287 U. S.
435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 23 J. Crm. L.
482, there was some doubt whether
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or not the duty to act on the question of entrapment remained with
the court even though it could be
submitted to the jury. Cf., opinion
of Roberts, J., in the Sorrells case.
However, it is settled by that case
that where the evidence is conflicting, an issue of fact is presented
which is within the province of the
jury to decide after proper instructions: Jarl v. United States (C. C.
A. 8th, 1927) 19 F. (2d) 891, Butts
v. United States, supra. Some of the
considerations involved in determining whether entrapment is present,
are whether or not the officer misrepresented himself, whether he originated or initiated a plan which ultimately led to the commission of
the offense, or whether he suggested
the act or lured, aided, abetted or
encouraged the accused in crime:
Lucadanio v. United States (C. C.
A. 2d, 1922) 280 Fed. 653; Rosso v.
United States (C. C. A. 3d, 1924)
1 F. (2d) 717; Rothinan v. United
States (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) 270 Fed.
31; Aulbinan v. United States (C.
C. A. 5th, 1923) 289 Fed. 251;
O'Brien v. United States (C. C. A.
7th, 1931) 51 F. (2d) 674.
Undoubtedly there is some element of entrapment in many cases
where criminals are apprehended,
and it is difficult to draw a dividing
line between legitimate devices of
crime detection and illegal entrapment. As was said by Mr. Justice
Roberts in the Sorrells case supra,
"Society is at war with the criminal
classes, and courts have uniformly
held that in waging warfare, the
forces of prevention and detection
may use traps, decoys, and deception to obtain evidence of the commission of crime." But where, in
addition to the element of artifice
or deception, there is a substantial
showing of the planning of an offense by an officer and his procure-
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ment of its commission the issue
should be submitted to the jury. In
the principal case use of a former
mistress to play on the sympathies
of the accused might well have been
regarded as a questionable device in
detecting violations, and in view
of conflicting testimony as to the
motives, the question properly should
have been left with the jury.
FRED J. GINSBURG.

EVIDENCE-ADmISSIBILITY

RLATED

OF UN-

OTnFNsEs. - [Arkansas]

The deceased and a Mrs. May were
seated on the ground in a woods not
far from the pavement when the defendant, carrying a shot-gun, approached them. According to Mrs.
May's testimony, he forced them to
stand, by shooting the gun between
them-some of the shot entering
their legs. He led them far into
the woods and ordered the deceased
to take off all his clothes and at
once shot and killed him. The defendant then demanded Mrs. May to
accompany him a short distance and
there lie on the ground which she
refused to do. The defendant then
stabbed her with his pocket-knife
and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. The trial court
permitted Mrs. May to testify to
this attack. The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. It was insisted on behalf
of the defendant that he was not
being tried for rape but for murder,
and that the admission of evidence
of another crime, having no relation to the crime charged, was prejudicial and reversible error. Held:
on appeal, affirmed. Evidence may
be introduced to prove the motive
of the crime for which the accused
is on trial, even though it may point
him out as guilty of an independent
and dissimilar offense: Banks v.

State (Ark. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 518.
That evidence of other unrelated
crimes is not admissible, as a general rule, is too well recognized for
elaboration: 1
Wigmore, "Evidence" (2d ed., 1923) §300; Underhill, "Criminal Evidence," (3d ed.,
1923) §150. To this rule however,
several distinct exceptions have
been permitted from absolute necessity to aid in the detection and
punishment of crime:
Underhill,
op. cit. supra, §151; McHenry v.
United States (App. D. C. 1921)
276 Fed. 761. Where two or more
crimes are a part of one transaction, Miller v. State (1917) 13 Okla.
Cr. 176, 163 Pac. 131, or where it
is necessary to complete the res
gestae, Gibson v. State (1916) 14
Ala. App. 111, 72 So. 210; Holland
v. State (1908) 55 Tex. Cr. 27, 115
S. W. 48, or where guilty knowledge
and purpose must be proved, Choate
v. Comm. (1917) 176 Ky. 427, 195
S. W. 1080, or where motive need
be shown, State v. Greco (1918) 7
Del. 140, 104 Atl. 637; State v.
Buster (1915) 28 Idaho 110, 152
Pac. 196; Underhill v. State (1916)
185 Ind. 587, 114 N. E. 88; Appleby
v. State (1915) 11 Okla. Cr. 284,
146 Pac. 228, or where the identity
of the accused is in question, Romes
v. Comm. (1915) 164 Ky. 334, 175
S. W. 669; 1 Wharton, "Criminal
Evidence" (10th ed., 1912) p. 145,
such testimony has been admitted.
But there has always been the limitation that a logical connection between the collateral offense and the
crime in issue must exist; otherwise
there is a danger of prejudice:
Chaffee, "The Progress of the Law"
(1919) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 433. The
court in the instant case admitted
the testimony of the unconnected
act under the exceptions that the two
crimes were a part of one transaction and common motive. In order
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to do this however, it was necessary
to assume that the objective of the
defendant was to attack Mrs. May
and that the logical means to that
end was the removal of the deceased.
Without this assumption
there are no facts on the record to
show why the deceased was killed.
Two objections may be made to
such a treatment of the case. First,
the court assumed that the purpose
of the defendant was to commit a
rape. It is common learning that
there are no assumptions or presumptions against the accused in a
criminal case. Conceding this, however, evidence of collateral offenses
are seldom admitted unless they
have been completely proved, State
v. Hyde (1911) 234 Mo. 200, 136
S. W. 316; Gart v. United States
(C. C. A. 8th, 1919) 294 Fed. 66,
and there is no evidence that this
was done in the principal case.
Secondly, it was unnecessary for
the appellate court to justify the
trial court's admission of this testimony in order to sustain the conviction. There appeared to be sufficient eye-witness testimony upon
which to obtain a verdict against
the defendant. To add another pillar to an already completed edifice
by parading other unrelated offenses
committed by the accused points to
a disposition which is inconsistent
with unbiased criminal jurisprudence. Furthermore, such activities lead to dangers of unjust administration of the law. For instance, if A, in heat of argument
fights with B, a detective, knocking
him unconscious and B dies, this
may be justifiable or excusable
homicide and at most would be manslaughter:
People v. Crenshaw
(1921) 298 Ill. 412, 131 N. E. 576.
Assuming similar facts, if A, after
the fight, passes a neighborhood
store, robs it and is apprehended
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and tried for the homicide, shall it
be assumed that the motive of the
homicide was the robbery? If tne
rule of the principal case becomes
precedent the court may so hold:
William v. State (1931) 183 Ark.
870, 39 S. W. (2d) 295.
Though ordinarily, when the
lower court inflicts the highest punishment, the appellate court is loath
to affirm unless the trial was practically free from error, Baker, "Reversible Error in Homicide Cases"
(1932) 23 J. Crim. L. 28, if the defendant, from the evidence presented, clearly appears to be guilty,
the courts usually affirm a case containing errors, which under other
circumstances might have been considered sufficient to reverse the case:
Harrison v. State (1924) 97 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 468, 262 S. W. 472; People
v. Watkins (1923) 309 Ill. 318, 141
N. E. 204. That the defendant deserved the most severe treatment is
clear from the evidence, but the zeal
of the court for reaching a guilty
verdict established a ruling that
should seldom be applied, if at all,
and one which was certainly unnecessary in order to reach a conviction in the principal case: Underhill, op. cit. supra, §151; People
v. Townsend (1921) 214 Mich. 267,
183 N. W. 177. The case could
have been affirmed and the danger
avoided by a ruling that the testimony was irrelevant and too remote
to the specific offense to be prejudicial and though it was improperly
admitted, yet could not have been
reversible error: State v. Bean (N.
C. 1922) 115 S. E. 176. Admissibility of such testimony is left very
much to the discretion of the trial
court, and since it may be abused
by an over-zealous and righteously
angry judge, the appellate court
ought to review his rulings.
RAYMOND NAJARIAN.
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